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Centre for
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Current Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme Design and Implementation

Thematic Working Paper 1

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(with an initial contribution from Jeremy Ginnifer)

July 2008

Contribution to the Project:

**DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building
and the Interests of the Poor**



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Working Paper 1:

Current Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme Design and Implementation

Guy Lamb

1. Introduction

The success of programmes that relate to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life is dependent on four crucial aspects. First, it is essential that there is insightful and comprehensive planning that is based on sound research and analysis in order for a realistic strategy to be developed. Second, it is critical that the requisite political will exist at all levels to implement this strategy efficiently and effectively. Third, these programmes are typically expensive and time-consuming processes, and hence the necessary resources, namely financial and material support, and technical expertise, need to be secured. Fourth, it is vital that effective monitoring and evaluation systems are included in DDR processes, and that these systems are an integral part of the implementation strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine critically current DDR developments, as well as explore the possible next steps for DDR. This will include the consideration of the current state of DDR and the extent to which initiatives such as the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), as well as other contemporary policy instruments and programmes encompass a human security perspective and reflects the interests of the poor. The key question that this paper will explore is: to what extent does current or “third generation” DDR programming differ from those DDR initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s (or “second generation”)¹; and to what extent do they contribute to the sustainable alleviation of poverty?

Thus, the intention of this paper is to interrogate current international thinking and practice on DDR, and it seeks to determine whether DDR programmers and operational personnel are “learning the lessons” from previous DDR processes. This paper draws upon a literature review, current policy documents, official reports and communications, independent evaluations, and some primary field research on contemporary DDR processes, namely in Central Africa, West Africa, Sudan, Nepal and East Timor. It primarily focuses on the demobilisation and reintegration aspects of DDR.

¹ First generation DDR were those post- World War I and World War II processes that were oriented towards the demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of soldiers from those major armed conflicts.

The structure of this paper is divided into the following sections: an outline of definitions and concepts used in the paper; an overview of the evolution of the DDR concept and DDR programming; an assessment of the MDRP; an examination of the SIDDR and its impact; an appraisal of the IDDRS and its implementation; and concluding remarks and recommendations.

Table 1: Definitions and concepts

Demobilisation

Demobilisation is a planned process by which the number of personnel under arms and in military command structures is significantly reduced. It includes the reduction in size of the regular military, paramilitary forces, as well as rebel groups (sometimes after their integration into new regular armed forces). In practice, demobilisation usually involves the assembly, disarmament, administration, counselling, skills assessment and then the discharge of former combatants, with a compensation package and/or assistance programme in place.

Resettlement/Reinsertion

Resettlement or reinsertion is the process that follows demobilisation, whereby former combatants are transported and settled in the areas and communities of their preference. In a number of resettlement processes, former combatants have been provided with money and/or other resources to assist them with this process either by national governments or donor agencies.

Reintegration

Reintegration is a complex economic, political, social and psychological process by which former soldiers make the transition from a military life to a civilian life. Reintegration is generally a long-term process, as it may take several years for ex-soldiers and their families to adapt to a civilian way of life. Hence a distinction is often made between economic, political, social and psychological reintegration.

Traditionally the following have been provided by governments and/or donor agencies as resettlement and/or reintegration support: cash payments, foodstuffs (or coupons), healthcare, clothing, housing, furniture and housing equipment and building material, seeds or agricultural equipment, agricultural extension services, scholarships and school fees for children, counselling and vocational guidance, legal and business advice, job placement or apprenticeships, general referral services, access to land, public works and public sector job creation, wage subsidies, credit schemes, and technical training.

2. The Evolution of DDR Programming and the DDR Concept

2.1 An historical overview of DDR programming

Programmes that target the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants are not recent phenomena. DDR programmes took place in many countries after World War I and World War II, and there are examples of some level of policy development to deal with large numbers of ex-combatants after many historical conflicts. For example, after the Second Anglo-Boer War in South Africa (1902) a number of DDR programmes were pursued. Historical evidence even suggests that crude DDR programmes were implemented during the period of the Roman Empire.² From the early 1980s, however, DDR began to develop into a specialist field, especially with the conclusion of armed conflicts in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Uganda and Namibia.

Over the past three decades, DDR programmes have had mixed results. Some have been innovative and remarkably successful, as was the case in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. Others have been glaringly ineffective, with the result that many ex-combatants have been unable to secure employment, and/or make the necessary social and psychological adjustments to make the successful transition to civilian life. As a result, these individuals have become marginalised members of their societies, and live in conditions of abject poverty. There are a number of studies to support this assertion.³

From the 1980s, the World Bank was the dominant programming force behind most DDR processes (which have predominantly been undertaken in Africa). However, from the early-1990s other international agencies, such as the UN (particularly the UNDP), donor governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) became more actively involved in DDR initiatives.

² Brent D. Shaw. 1984. "Bandits in the Roman Empire", *Past and Present*, No. 105, November, pp. 3-52.

³ See: World Bank. 1993. *Demobilisation and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: the Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies* (World Bank: Washington D.C.); Colletta, N. J. et al, 1996. *The Transition From War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Washington D.C.: The World Bank); Don Foster, Paul Haupt and Marésa de Beer. 2005. *The Theatre of Violence: Narratives of Protagonists in the South African Conflict*. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, p. 15-16; Centre for Conflict Resolution. 2003. *The Reintegration into Civilian life of Demobilised Umkhonto we Sizwe and Azanian People's Liberation Army Ex-Combatants*. Unpublished report, Cape Town, p. 22; Sasha Gear. 2002. "Wishing us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-Combatants in the New South Africa," *Violence and Transition Series*, Vol. 8; "Reaping the Whirlwind: The Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Zimbabwe, 1979-2004", In David Everatt (ed.). *Only Useful Until Democracy? Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Apartheid South Africa with Lessons from Kosovo and Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg: Atlantic Philanthropies; Jakkie Cilliers, J. (ed.), 1995. *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*. Halfway House, South Africa: The Institute for Defence Policy.

It was only in the 1990s that considerable financial resources and intellectual capital began to be devoted to DDR related issues. For example, in 1991, the U.S. and Italy provided significant amounts of funding for the Ethiopian demobilisation process. The EU, Cuba and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) financed the Namibian DDR process (1989).⁴ The Sierra Leone DDR process (1997-2002), which disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated some 72,500 combatants into civilian life, was funded from a Multi-Donor Trust Fund of US\$31.5 million.⁵

Since 2000 there has been a discernable trend among DDR programmers towards multi-country coordinated approaches, particularly where the conflict in question had a multi-national dimension. Previous country-level initiatives had not always appreciated the regional dimensions of conflict. The US\$500 million Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), which addresses DDR issues in countries in the Great Lakes region/Central Africa, is the most notable example of this trend, and is examined in some detail below. The MDRP is also notable for its attempts to disaggregate DDR programmes in order to provide specialised support to specific groups, such as female ex-combatants, former child soldiers the disabled, and combatants on foreign soil.

Table 1 below provides a listing and basic details of DDR programmes that were in existence during the first quarter of 2007. It reveals that the vast majority of recent DDR programmes have been taking place in Africa (16 out of 22). In addition, compared to the non-African programmes, DDR programmers and programme staff in Africa are required to support substantially larger numbers and more diverse sets of beneficiaries. The implications of this are that more sophistication in the design of DDR programmes has been required in Africa.

Of the total programmes, three were in the early stages of being established, seven were in the demobilisation phase, 10 were in the process of implementing reintegration processes, while one had ended, and another had been disrupted.

Table 2: Current DDR programmes (as at March 2007)

Country	Combatants	Composition	Demobilised (%)	Situation
Afghanistan	63,380	Militias	62,000 (98.4)	Ended
Angola	138,000	105,000 militias & 33,000 armed forces	97,115 (70)	Demobilisation
Burundi	78,000	41,000 armed forces, 21,500	21,769 (39) ⁶	Demobilisation

⁴ World Bank. 1993. *Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).

⁵ World Bank. 2002. "Sierra Leone: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration," *Findings: Good Practice Info Brief*, No. 81, October.

⁶ The demobilisation of the national armed forces is not taken into account in this figure.

		militias & 15,500 guerrillas		
Cambodia	30,000	Armed forces	40,000 (133)	Demobilisation ⁷
Central African Republic	7,565	Militias	7,565 (100)	Reintegration
Chad	9,000	Armed forces	9,000	Reintegration
Colombia (AUC)	30,000	Paramilitaries	31,761 (105.9)	Reintegration
Côte d'Ivoire	45,000	41,000 Militias & 4,000 armed forces	981 (2)	Interrupted
Democratic Republic of Congo	150,000	112,000 militias & 38,000 armed forces ⁸	102,331 (68)	Demobilisation
Eritrea	200,000	Armed forces	200,000	Reintegration
Filipinas (Mindanao)	25,000	Guerrillas	-	Reintegration
Guinea-Bissau	12,595	10,544 armed forces & 2,051 militias	11,445 (90.8)	Reintegration
Haiti	6,000 ⁹	Militias	128 (2.1)	Prospecting
Indonesia (GAM)	5,000	Guerrillas	6,145 (123)	Reintegration
Liberia	119,000	12,000 armed forces, 91,000 guerrillas & 16,000 militias	101,495 (85.3)	Reintegration
Nepal	12,000 ¹⁰	Guerrillas	-	Cantonment
Niger	3,160	Militias	3,160	Reintegration
Rep. Congo	30,000	Militias	17,400 (58)	Demobilisation
Rwanda	45,000	30,000 militias & 15,000 armed forces	26,436 (58.5)	Demobilisation
Somalia	53,000	Militias	1,266 (2.3)	Pilot stage
Sudan ¹¹	178,500	121,000 armed forces, 40,500 guerrillas & 17,000 vulnerable groups	21,500 (12)	Demobilisation
Uganda	15,310	Guerrillas	16,133 (105)	Reintegration
TOTAL (22)	1,255,510	741,466 OAG &	783,049 (61.7)	

⁷ The process interrupted between 2003 and 2005 due to a lack of funds.

⁸ Some 23,000 were foreign troops from Burundi (4,000), Republic of Congo (4,000) and Rwanda (15,000).

⁹ This figure is an estimate.

¹⁰ This figure is an estimate.

¹¹ This figure is an estimate.

		513,544 armed forces		
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Source: Escola de pau. 2008¹²

2.2 The generation of knowledge on DDR

Prior to 2000, publications on DDR processes were generally technical in nature, country specific, and did not actively consider the connections between DDR and debates about human development, human security and poverty alleviation. Only a small group of researchers and demilitarisation specialists plied their trade in this sector. The institutions that specialised in DDR included, amongst others: the World Bank, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),¹³ the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Office (ILO),¹⁴ the Institute for Defence Policy (now the Institute for Security Studies---ISS), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR).

Since 2000 the generation of knowledge about DDR related issues and the investment of resources in the design and implementation of DDR programmes has increased exponentially. DDR appears to have become an industry. Numerous research institutes, university departments and militaries are currently specialising in DDR. Research projects that interrogate the links between DDR and transitional justice, post-conflict armed crime, migration and poverty (to name a few) are currently being pursued. Consulting groups that specialise in designing and assessing DDR processes have emerged, and both government agencies and tertiary institutions are offering practical DDR courses.

Internationally, momentum has been building to develop guidelines and standards on DDR processes. The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) (2005) brought together DDR specialists, both governmental and non-governmental, in a year-long process that was designed to challenge some existing practices, and recommend new approaches and policies that would contribute to more effective and holistic DDR implementation. A new initiative by a UN Inter-Agency Working Group produced the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), in 2006, as a guide for implementation of DDR processes. In 2007 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a handbook on security sector reform, which includes sections on DDR and post-conflict peacebuilding.¹⁵

¹² Escola de pau. 2008. *Analysis of the DDR programs existing in the world during 2006*, p. 18, at <http://www.pangea.org/unescopau/img/programas/desarme/ddr004i.pdf>.

¹³ The annual BICC Conversion Survey, which was first published in 1996, was one of the first initiatives that sought to track international DDR trends.

¹⁴ The ILO compiled some of the earliest guidelines and manuals for skills training for demobilised soldiers.

¹⁵ OECD. 2007. *OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris: OECD. It is important to note that SIDDR, IDDRS and the OECD handbook are not the first such initiatives in this regard. For example, both the International Labour Office (ILO) and the

These new initiatives were matched on the ground with new programming models, of which the most notable and ambitious was the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, covering nine conflict affected states in sub-Saharan Africa.

3. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)

3.1 Overview of the MDRP

In August 1998, a loose collection of rebel groups supported by the governments of Rwanda and Uganda launched a military campaign to oust Laurent Kabila, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from office. This was a position that Kabila had only acquired a year earlier when he had led a rebellion with Rwandan financial and military support that resulted in the toppling of the kleptocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila's demise was forestalled with the arrival of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops who were able to repulse the rebel advance on Kinshasa.

In July 1999 a ceasefire agreement, which included a significant (DDR) component, was consented to by all countries to the conflict. The ceasefire agreement stipulated that all foreign troops must withdraw from DRC territory by February 2000. However, following delays in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, as well as the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001, the majority of foreign soldiers were only withdrawn by late 2001.

The MDRP was launched in April 2002 by the World Bank and the UN, in consultation with other donor governments and agencies. Its geographical focus is the greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa, and it was established to "support the consolidation of peace and stability in the region through a comprehensive framework for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration."¹⁶ The specific countries that are part of the MDRP are: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, the Republic of Congo (ROC), Rwanda and Uganda.¹⁷ As Namibia and Zimbabwe also participated in the DRC armed conflict (in support of the Kabila

collaboration between German Technical Co-operation, Norwegian Defence International Centre, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the Swedish National Defence College have developed DDR training manuals and handbooks. See ILO. 1997. *Manual on Training and Employment Options for Ex-combatants*. Geneva: ILO; and Gleichmann, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson. 2004. *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide*. Frankfurt: German Technical Co-operation, Norwegian Defence International Centre, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the Swedish National Defence College.

¹⁶ World Bank. 2001. "Partners Consult on Greater Great Lakes Demobilization and Reintegration Program and Trust Fund", *Press Release No: 2002/165/AFR*, 19 December.

¹⁷ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet* (March 2007) (<http://www.mdrp.org>).

government), it is envisaged that support will be provided to these two countries should the need arise.¹⁸

In 2008 the MDRP is providing support to national programmes in Angola, Burundi, the DRC, the ROC and Rwanda. Programmes in the CAR and Uganda were originally part of the MDRP process, but were concluded during 2007. The Angolan and Rwandan programmes are close to completion. The Burundi and DRC programmes have made significant progress in terms of demobilisation and reinsertion, and are in the early stages of reintegration support. The ROC programme has only recently been initiated.¹⁹

The MDRP reflects a significant departure from the conventional approach to programming in terms of the demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) into civilian life of former combatants. Prior to this programme, D&R processes were typically designed and implemented at the national level. In the case of DRC, however, a number of countries and rebel groups from neighbouring countries to the DRC were directly involved, and so a regional approach was advocated. The mid-term review of the MDRP described the programme as “a radical innovation... a bold and experimental effort, one that is unprecedented in the post-conflict field.”²⁰

The MDRP has become one of the largest D&R programmes in scope and range currently in existence, seeking to co-ordinate and provide assistance to almost half a million ex-combatants in the abovementioned seven countries. The key mandate of the MDRP is to support and/or supervise national governments in the greater Great Lakes region that are seeking to devise and implement D&R programmes. The main functions of the MDRP are to: contribute to the establishment of standard approaches, coordinate DDR projects, and provide financial and technical assistance in the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants in the seven countries in the programme.²¹

The World Bank and 11 donor governments provide funding for the MDRP. The World Bank contributes approximately US\$200 million, while the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Commission provide close to US\$300 million (of which US\$200 million is currently committed). Funding for the disarmament

¹⁸ MDRP. ND. *Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes Region (MDRP at a Glance)*, pp. 3-7 (<http://www.mdrp.org>).

¹⁹ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet* (March 2007) at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

²⁰ Development Alternatives, Inc. 2005. *A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation: Midterm Review of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)*, (Bethesda: Development Alternatives), p. 2.

²¹ MDRP. ND. *Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes Region (MDRP at a Glance)*, p. 3 at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

component of the DDR process is derived from other sources.²² The MDRP estimates that it finances “95% of DDR programmes in the region”.²³

In terms of national programmes, the MDRP does not take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ within the countries it operates, but rather the nature of the armed conflict, national characteristics and dynamics, as well as the specific socioeconomic profiles of ex-combatants are taken into account when designing the programme. Typically, a national programme comprises the following elements: demobilisation; reinsertion; reintegration; support to special groups; and implementation arrangements.

In addition to national projects, the MDRP also supports special projects, which are generally smaller in scale. Usually they are designed to address specific, urgent issues while a national program is in the process of being devised, such as the repatriation of ex-combatants to their country of origin, or to provide assistance in parts of a country that are outside of government control. The latter is the case in eastern DRC where emergency community-based reintegration activities are needed for groups that are not signatories of the Lusaka Agreement, particularly child soldiers. In 2007 10 MDRP Special Projects were under implementation, and two had been completed.²⁴

The MDRP reports that it undertakes and supports projects that are regional in nature and/or address crosscutting issues, such as gender and combatants on foreign soil (COFS). In terms of gender, the MDRP targets female ex-combatants as they have often been subject to gender-specific abuse. In addition, they may have experienced certain social freedoms during conflict, only to be subject to social repression on their return to more restrictive traditional female roles. Similarly, young male ex-combatants may be stigmatized and excluded if they are unable to find employment or access land, thereby making them vulnerable to future mobilization.²⁵

It is estimated that there are between 25,000 and 45,000 combatants on foreign soil (COFS) in the greater Great Lakes region. The MDRP actively seeks to facilitate the return of COFS to their country of origin.²⁶ For example, the MDRP estimates that there are six distinct foreign armed groups operating from the DRC (mainly in North and South Kivu), with the most problematic being the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) (formerly referred to as the *Interahamwe* militia),

²² MDRP. ND. *Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes Region (MDRP at a Glance)*, p. 4 at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

²³ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for the DRC*. New York: MDRP, p. 5.

²⁴ MDRP. ND. *Partnering for Peace in Africa: Breaking the Conflict Cycle in the Greater Great Lakes Region (MDRP at a Glance)*, p. 11 at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁶ MDRP. 2006. *Report of Proceedings: Advisory and Trust Fund Committee Meetings*, Paris, November 20th-22nd, (Washington, D.C.: MDRP), p. 7; MDRP. 2002. “Situation Update: Focus on DRC and Rwanda”, Planning and Management Task Force Meeting on the DRC, United Nations Headquarters, 23 October.

which “continues to directly affect the stabilisation of peace and security” in the DRC.²⁷

The MDRP also claims that it facilitates the regional sharing of technical knowledge and other related information, capacity building approaches and joint analysis among participating national programs through semi-annual meetings of the regional Technical Coordination Group. Database harmonization for national programmes and special projects has taken place, to limit the possibility that ex-combatants will cross borders and illegally benefit from multiple D&R operations. The MDRP also undertakes research to enhance the knowledge and understanding among its staff of DDR issues.²⁸

3.2 Analysis of the MDRP and country programmes

In terms of the projected lifespan of the MDRP, the programme passed the halfway mark in February 2006. At this point in time, 295,134 former combatants had been demobilised, and 242,150 and 180,207 had been, or were in the process of being, assisted through reinsertion and reintegration support processes respectively. In comparison, by the end of October 2007, the number of beneficiaries of MDRP processes had almost doubled in number: 412,875 former combatants had been demobilised; and 318,991 and 391,227 had received or were in the process of receiving reinsertion and reintegration support respectively. In addition, of the US\$485 million that had been committed by donor agencies by mid-2007, 74% had already been disbursed (see table 3 below).

Table 3: MDRP performance: Supporting beneficiaries

Number of beneficiaries							
Country		Actual: 31.1.06	Target: 31.1.06	% of target	Actual: 30.10.07	Target: 30.10.07	% of target
Angola	Demobilisation	97,115	138,000	70	97,390	138,000	71
	Reinsertion	51,287	62,716	81	53,607	62,716	85
	Reintegration ²⁹	62,210	166,662	37	72,164	166,662	43
Burundi	Demobilisation	22,011	55,000	40	23,185	55,000	42
	Reinsertion	18,996	55,000	34	20,144	47,000	43
	Reintegration	5,412	55,000	10	13,029	47,000	28
CAR ³⁰	Demobilisation	7,556	7,565	100	7,556	7,565	100
	Reinsertion	7,533	7,565	100	7,533	7,565	100
	Reintegration	7,556	7,565	100	7,556	7,565	100
DRC	Demobilisation	116,939	150,000	78	124,059	150,000	83
	Reinsertion	101,250	120,000	84	102,013	120,000	85
	Reintegration	45,593	90,000	50	47,043	90,000	52

²⁷ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for the DRC*. New York: MDRP, p. 114.

²⁸ MDRP. 2007. “Regional Projects”, at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

²⁹ Refers to the receiving of reintegration assistance only.

³⁰ Project closed on 28 February 2007.

ROC	Demobilisation	0	11,000	0	0	11,000	0
	Reinsertion	0	11,000	0	5,059	19,000	27
	Reintegration	0	30,000	0	0	30,000	0
Rwanda	Demobilisation	26,462	36,000	73	26,668	36,000	74
	Reinsertion	38,772	47,400	82	38,978	47,400	82
	Reintegration	40,068	50,000	77	40,415	50,000	81
Uganda ³¹	Demobilisation	16,193	15,310	105	16,256	15,310	106
	Reinsertion	14,527	15,310	95	14,816	15,310	97
	Reintegration	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	Demobilisation	286,276	412,875	69	295,134	412,875	71
	Reinsertion	232,365	318,991	72	242,150	318,991	74
	Reintegration	160,839	399,227	39	180,207	391,227	45

(Source: MDRP)³²

Table 4: MDRP trust fund: Commitments and disbursements by country (as at 30 June 2007)

Programmes/projects	Committed amount (US\$)	Disbursed (US\$)	% disbursed
Angola	89,182,952	41,838,524	57
Burundi	79,133,058	41,521,205	52
Central African Republic	9,777,777	9,727,000	99
Congo, Republic of	17,000,000	2,508,650	15
Democratic Republic of Congo	241,956,152	224,341,092	93
Rwanda	44,207,701	35,318,029	93
Uganda	4,204,000	4,161,749	99
Total	485,460,863	359,415,250	74

Source: MDRP. 2007. *Monthly Statistical Progress Report September 2007*, p. 3.

The number of beneficiaries and funds disbursed has been used by the MDRP to measure its successes and failures, particularly with respect to reinsertion and reintegration. As table 2 indicates, MDRP has been relatively successful in facilitating demobilisation (71% of targeted beneficiaries) and providing reinsertion support (74% of targeted beneficiaries). In terms of total reintegration, considerable action on the part of the MDRP is still required, as only 45% of the aggregate beneficiary target had been achieved by October 2007.

In the DRC 85% and 52% of reinsertion and reintegration support has been disbursed respectively. This national programme has however been encountering difficulties in the North and South Kivu provinces due to a number of factors: the recent resurgence in violence; the non-compliance of some military groups and senior military personalities with the official D&R process; the establishment of militia groups; and

³¹ Project closed 30 June 2007.

³² MDRP. 2007. *Quarterly Progress Report, April-June 2007*, at <http://www.mdrp.org>, p. 4.

the inability of the national armed forces to establish order in the eastern DRC.³³ Nonetheless, the DRC programme has been relatively successful in providing support to 29,000 children who had been associated with armed forces. This support included family tracing, reunification assistance and reintegration support.³⁴

In Rwanda, by October 2007, more than 80% of reinsertion and reintegration support had been disbursed. This programme has pursued a more holistic approach to reintegration than many other national programmes. For example, the partners/spouses of former combatants have been included in some training programmes.³⁵ However, the effectiveness of this programme has been undermined by the instability in the eastern DRC and the activities of rebel groups in that area.³⁶ The funding for the project has been extended until December 2008, but the MDRP Secretariat has sought ways to develop an exit strategy for Rwanda, which would improve the prospects for sustainability of the D&R process after the phasing out of the MDRP presence.³⁷

Both the CAR and Ugandan programmes met their proclaimed targets, and were subsequently phased out during 2007. However, these programmes were not without their implementation lessons and challenges. In CAR, in particular, there were serious difficulties in the disarmament stage, with only 190 of the 7,565 beneficiaries disarmed, completely negating the 'one man, one gun' principle of the programme. There were also serious doubts about the eligibility of many of the participants: there was a notable urban bias in the distribution of reinsertion support (85% of beneficiaries resided in Bangui, the capital). The distribution of reinsertion kits was often delayed, and the spouses of ex-combatants were excluded from the reinsertion process (in contradiction to the design of the programme).³⁸

The lack of meaningful national ownership of the MDRP process in CAR led to tension between government officials and the in-country staff of the MDRP, working in the Project for the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Community Assistance - PRAC. According to the former staff of the now disbanded national government's *Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration* (CNDDR), the composition of PRAC (which was staffed by expatriates), and the manner in which activities were designed and implemented, contributed to friction between the two bodies. CNDDR former staff indicated that: PRAC staff had received higher salaries than those of CNDDR officials; PRAC had implemented un-budgeted

³³ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report*. New York: MDRP, p. 4.

³⁴ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet: Democratic Republic of Congo, October 2007*, at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

³⁵ MDRP. 2006. *Quarterly Progress Report, October-December 2006*, at <http://www.mdrp.org>, pp. 5-7.

³⁶ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet: Rwanda, October 2007*, at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

³⁷ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Rwanda*. New York: MDRP, p. 164.

³⁸ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Central African Republic*. New York: MDRP, pp. 98-99.

activities; and the DDR eligibility criteria applied by PRAC had not taken the dynamics of the CAR conflict into account.³⁹ According to the MDRP: “Weak communication between stakeholders involved in the PRAC resulted in a number of misunderstandings and a lack of confidence and trust at all levels of the programme”.⁴⁰

In Uganda, there was a very different context for DDR: MDRP support targeted the Amnesty Commission, which was established to support those former rebels and associated individuals that had renounced and had withdrawn from the armed rebellion against the Ugandan government, and had applied for amnesty. Since the conflict with the LRA continued after the initiation of DDR activities, there was no possibility of reaching all potential beneficiaries. In addition, the MDRP Secretariat has expressed concern that the current weak capacity of the Amnesty Commission may undermine the effectiveness of follow on activities.⁴¹ The MDRP presence in Uganda appears to have provided an important source of funds to enable the Amnesty Commission to make progress towards clearing the backlog of amnesty cases.⁴² The MDRP Secretariat has continued to collaborate with the national government (and other relevant organisations) to make arrangements for the DR&R components of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda.⁴³

In Angola, the MDRP programme only began after the conflict had ended and some disarmament and demobilisation programmes had been initiated. The MDRP involvement has supported a national programme to demobilize up to 138,000 ex-combatants and provide reintegration support to almost 167,000 ex-combatants. Eight sub-projects have been implemented that specifically target disabled ex-combatants.⁴⁴ As of December 2007, some 8,000 of those receiving reintegration support had been interviewed, of which 62% indicated that they were self-employed, 4% formally employed, 34% unemployed, and 97% have access to agricultural land.⁴⁵

The Burundi programme has made measurable progress in the provision of demobilisation and reintegration support, particularly with respect to children associated with fighting forces. By October 2007, some 3,041 children had been demobilised, and had received reintegration support.⁴⁶ However, DR&R progress has

³⁹ Nelson Alusala. 2008. *Emerging Human Security Issues in the Implementation of the MDRP Fund in the Central African Republic (CAR)*. Project Mini-Case Study: Institute for Security Studies (ISS)/CICS, at www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk.

⁴⁰ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Central African Republic*. New York: MDRP, p. 102.

⁴¹ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Uganda*. New York: MDRP, p. 176.

⁴² See Leah Finnegan, Catherine Flew. 2007. *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Uganda*. Project Mini Case-Study: Saferworld/CICS, at www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk.

⁴³ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet: Uganda, October 2007*, at www.mdrp.org.

⁴⁴ MDRP. 2006. *Quarterly Progress Report, October-December 2006*, at www.mdrp.org, pp. 4-7.

⁴⁵ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet: Angola, February 2008*, at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

⁴⁶ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet: Burundi, October 2007*, at <http://www.mdrp.org>.

been frustrated by the incomplete implementation of the peace agreement between the Burundian government and the *Forces Nationales Pour la Libération – Palipehutu* (FNL-Palipehutu), due to political and security dynamics between the two groups.⁴⁷ In addition, the DR&R process has been constrained by weak financial institutions, and a lack of national government and civil society institutional/technical capacity, which has contributed to delays and problems with respect to the effective delivery of reinsertion and reintegration support.⁴⁸

In October 2007, the MDRP officially commenced the provision of reintegration support to some 5,059 self-demobilised beneficiaries in the ROC.⁴⁹ However, stakeholders outside of the MDRP process expressed concern that implementing a reintegration process more than four years after the end of the armed conflict could result in negative and counter-productive dynamics. Instead, many analysts claim that resources should be directly channelled to projects that would benefit the community without privileging ex-combatants. Others claim that a DDR programme only serves to remind Congolese society of the war, and disrupts people's coping mechanisms.⁵⁰

4. Linking DDR with Poverty Alleviation and Promoting Human Security

In order to determine the extent to which those DDR processes that were designed and implemented by the MDRP have either contributed to, or undermined, poverty alleviation and human security in the Great Lakes region, the following three questions should be addressed:

- Did the MDRP process contribute to more effective national government capacity to design, manage and implement DDR programmes independently?
- Were the beneficiaries of DDR support able to secure sustainable employment and/or livelihoods after receiving reintegration support?
- Were the beneficiaries of DDR support actually able to integrate socially into the communities into which they were settled?

4.1 National ownership

According to the MDRP, “national ownership of DDR programme development and implementation” is one of its key principles, and has been “applied consistently in all national programmes supported by the MDRP, with the arguable exception of the

⁴⁷ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report: Country Report for Burundi*. New York: MDRP, pp. 5-8.

⁴⁸ Field research undertaken in Burundi by Henri Boshoff (Military Analyst, ISS), October 2007.

⁴⁹ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Fact Sheet: Republic of Congo, October 2007*, at www.mdrp.org.

⁵⁰ See Nelson Alusala and Guy Lamb. 2008. *Emerging Human Security Issues in the Planned Implementation of MDRP Fund in the Republic of Congo (RoC)*. ISS/CICS, DDR and Human Security Project Mini Case-Study, at www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk.

CAR”⁵¹ Despite this sentiment, comprehensive approaches or models that are oriented towards building sustainable D&R capacity and ownership within national governments appear not to have been given sufficient attention during the design of MDRP. This was probably due to the transitional or fragile nature of many of the Central African governments in which MDRP processes were established, as well as the urgent need for DDR programmes to be implemented in those countries.

As some MDRP processes have approached completion, there has been more attention paid to issues of national ownership and sustainability. For example, the World Bank is in the process of creating a “single-country Multi-Donor Trust Fund” to support ongoing and anticipated DDR processes in Uganda.⁵² In addition, during an MDRP seminar in Paris in mid-December 2007, presentations by two MDRP Secretariat staff members on DDR project exit strategies in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia indicated that the MDRP Secretariat was contemplating the manner in which national ownership of the DDR process should be promoted in those countries that the MDRP is seeking to exit.⁵³

4.2 Sustainable economic and social reintegration

In terms of ascertaining the impact and effectiveness of its various projects and activities, the MDRP appears to over-emphasise the quantification (as opposed to the assessment of quality) of its programming and activities. That is, the MDRP primarily evaluates itself in terms of targets that relate to the number of beneficiaries supported and funds disbursed (as detailed in tables 2 and 3 above). A primary focus on the quality of DDR interventions, which should include an assessment of the sustainability of economic and social reintegration programming, will provide a clearer indication of the impact of DDR interventions on poverty alleviation and human security.

Qualitative reflections are however not entirely absent within the MDRP community, as there has been some consideration of the long-term effectiveness of beneficiary support. There is an acknowledgement within the MDRP Secretariat and partner organisations that the quality of programme implementation and support is dependent on the political will of the national governments in question, technical capabilities, staff capacity, the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation, and the nature of the support and supervision of the MDRP Secretariat. In this regard, the World Bank conducts monitoring and evaluation exercises in order to rate the “implementation quality” of the MDRP projects and initiatives.⁵⁴

⁵¹ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report*. New York: MDRP, pp. 6.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 6-7. It is anticipated that the work of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund will be used to support the ongoing work of the Amnesty Commission, and possibly DDR in relation to the Lord’s Resistance Army (Ugandan rebel group).

⁵³ Presentations by Ingo Wiederhofer and Sean Bradley, MDRP Seminar, Paris, 13 December 2007.

⁵⁴ MDRP. 2007. *MDRP Joint Partner Mission Report*. New York: MDRP, pp. 9-10.

The MDRP has also commissioned a number of studies on the consequences and impact of reinsertion and reintegration in a select number of MDRP-supported countries. However, it is not clear if the results of these studies will have a significant impact on the manner in which the MDRP evaluates the impact of its various projects and activities. For example, in one of the working papers it is acknowledged that: “there is an important link between reintegration assistance to ex-combatants and wider community development”.⁵⁵ The paper concludes by stating that one of the key principles of successful reintegration programmes is that assistance should only be offered where it “leads to sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants”.⁵⁶ However, these types of conclusions have yet to be fully embedded in programme design and operations.

In general, there appears to be a growing acknowledgement among MDRP staff of the key linkages between DDR and broader sustainable development issues, but as yet this has not been translated into real changes in policy on the ground. During the MDRP Technical Co-ordination Group meetings in Paris in November 2006, a discussion took place on the relationships between DDR, poverty, conflict, and development issues. Despite this discussion, there appears to have been no recommendations to link the work of the MDRP with the broader dynamics of conflict, poverty and development in the future.⁵⁷

4.3 MDRP: recommendations for future programming

Despite the challenges and difficulties of promoting sustainable national ownership of DDR processes, and a limited appreciation for the qualitative dimensions of reintegration programming, the MDRP has arguably contributed to poverty alleviation and human security in the Great Lakes region. The financial contributions and specialised projects provided by the MDRP have no doubt improved the standard of living and personal security of the approximately 400,000 beneficiaries in the short-to medium-term. However, the long-term implications of this support at this point in time are unknown.

Hence, the MDRP and programmers in future DDR processes should consider taking the following broad recommendations into account:

- Approaches which aim to build capacity in national DDR structures and processes should be debated and formulated in the planning stage (rather than in the exit phase) of the DDR intervention. Such approaches/models should be determined in a consultative and transparent manner, and should be used as a performance indicator for the DDR intervention.

⁵⁵Sarah Michael. 2006. “Reintegration Assistance for Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for the MDRP”, *Working Paper No.1*, September. Washington, D.C.: MDRP, p.2.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p.34

⁵⁷ MDRP. 2006. *Report of Proceedings: Advisory and Trust Fund Committee Meetings*, Paris, November 20th-22nd. Washington, D.C.: MDRP, p. 31.

- Consideration of the long-term sustainability of DDR interventions, particularly the reintegration component, should be a central focus of DDR programming, as well as the manner in which these programmes are evaluated.
- There should be a critical reflection on whether conventional DDR interventions are appropriate for contexts where several years have passed since the end of the armed conflict. In such contexts, a DDR programme may contribute to domestic tension and conflict.

Should the MDRP community decide to amend its DDR interventions so that it pursues a more rigorous approach to human security and development, as well as poverty alleviation in the Great Lakes region, it is highly probable (as indicated by independent evaluators) that it will encounter institutional obstacles. The programme appears to have become overly bureaucratic and inflexible, and resistant to change. Inter-group tensions, rivalries and stumbling blocks have emerged. For example, the published mid-term review of the programme, claimed that “Institutional philosophies, agendas and interests have often clashed...relations between MDRP partners seem often acrimonious, characterized by mutual recrimination, and devoid of common vision”⁵⁸

The same review highlighted other bureaucratic and structural obstacles, including poor prioritization of projects and programming initiatives, weak or delayed field coordination; and limited involvement of local civil society actors and organizations.⁵⁹ One of the report’s key recommendations was that the MDRP leadership should “...make time to demonstrate creative leadership in DDR thinking (links to security, targeting and reintegration issues, special groups such as women associated with armed groups, the role of civil society, links to community development efforts, etc)”.⁶⁰

5. Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR)

The increasing importance of DDR in post-conflict peacebuilding programmes, the growing attention to programmes such as the MDRP, and the continued need for new DDR programmes in other post-conflict environments, prompted increasing research and evaluation of existing experiences, and a search for new guidelines and best

⁵⁸ Development Alternatives, Inc. 2005. *A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation: Midterm Review of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)*. Bethesda: Development Alternatives, p. iii.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 31

practice approaches for the international community. One of the key initiatives in this process was the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR), launched in Stockholm, in November 2004, with representatives attending from 23 countries and 14 national and international organisations, institutes and UN agencies. This was followed up with further meetings, until a final conference was held in Stockholm in November 2005.⁶¹

5.1 Overview of SIDDR

Although the SIDDR was launched as a mechanism to review DDR practice and challenge existing assumptions, in reality, the Final Report of the SIDDR largely reinforces conventional approaches to DDR, rather than advancing new, creative and unorthodox programming. Despite this, the report identifies key lessons and knowledge generated, albeit rather generalist, from past DDR programmes and experiences.

SIDDR primarily promoted DDR as a political process, where DDR was seen to have the potential to significantly contribute to state transition, stabilisation and recovery. According to the SIDDR Final Report, DDR should ideally facilitate the creation of an environment that is characterised by sufficient security, as well as minimum basic conditions for long-term peaceful development. Human security concerns seemed to be of secondary consideration, although debates about human security did feature in the deliberations over the SIDDR, particularly in the working group sessions. Much of the SIDDR agenda focused on strengthening DDR capacities and responses and drawing attention to mainstream DDR during integrated peace missions.

Further, SIDDR recognised the importance of linking DDR to peace agreements and peace missions. This included stipulating the relevance of DDR in peace agreements and agreements on future national defence forces, as well as clear indications on how the parties should design and implement DDR processes. Further, it stressed the political nature of DDR during peace processes and recommended that DDR issues be added to the political work of peace missions. For example, it recommended that an international advisory team of independent DDR experts should be established to assist in peace negotiations, and suggested that this team could play a confidence-building role in relation to parties to the conflict.⁶²

One of the key elements of the SIDDR is the promotion of national ownership of DDR processes. In the SIDDR Final Report it is recommended that national leadership and institutions should have the leading role and political responsibility for the DDR of ex-combatants, even when internationally or regionally mandated peace

⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden. 2005. *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration: Final Report*. Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, pp. 10-12.

⁶² Ibid, p. 22.

missions or international institutions are driving the organisation, supervision and monitoring of the DDR process.⁶³

SIDDR also emphasised local community engagement in DDR, a key factor in meeting human security needs during DDR. It suggested that there should be more transparency for local communities in decision-making, resource availability and information sharing in DDR processes and that there should be broad consultation processes for building national ownership and leadership in the DDR process. SIDDR also endorsed the idea of establishing funds that would assist communities with support for receiving ex-combatants, to complement DDR programmes. It was assumed that this would not only address the frequent accusation that DDR programmes tend to singly reward those combatants who took up arms, but it would also contribute to meeting the needs of communities and individuals affected by the conflict. It would also boost community confidence in DDR programmes.⁶⁴

In terms of social reintegration, an area where DDR has often been weak, SIDDR stressed the expediency of linking DDR with transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms, arguing that post-conflict recovery is unlikely to progress without effective justice and reconciliation interventions.⁶⁵

5.2 Key SIDDR recommendations

As part of the SIDDR Final Report, a series of generic and broad (non-geographic specific) recommendations were formulated to advance DDR policy and programming. Some of the recommendations are as follows:

- DDR programmes in the contexts of peace processes should be designed in such a manner that they contribute to future sustainable long-term development.
- DDR programmes should gear reintegration towards improving security in the short-term, but this should not undermine the longer-term objectives of sustainable peace and development.
- Reintegration should be disaggregated into sequential components: reinsertion (transitional reintegration) assistance directly following demobilisation; and sustainable reintegration assistance in the medium to longer-term.
- Reinsertion programmes should be designed to provide either a cash and/or in-kind safety net, or 'first step' programmes such as labour intensive public works for clean-up and reconstruction, with the purpose of ensuring stability while the ground is prepared for more sustainable reintegration programmes.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 22.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 23-32.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 31-32.

- Security-focused DDR processes should target ex-combatants for support. Donors should try to provide matching funds for parallel programmes for the benefit of receiving communities and other special war-affected groups.
- Gender-sensitive DDR programmes, including gender-differentiated programmes targeting women, should be implemented. Similarly, the needs of women and children associated with conflict, who may not qualify for DDR programmes, need to be addressed through parallel programmes.
- DDR programmes may benefit from efforts to stimulate the local private business sector and civil society, such as the reduction of barriers to doing business, access to credit, technology and technical support.
- The private sector and civil society should be encouraged through appropriate policy and programming incentives to support local capacity building in parallel with support to economic and social reintegration efforts.
- DDR programmes should be designed and implemented in relation to transitional justice measures in order to reconstitute civic trust and smooth the process of social reintegration.
- Reintegration programmes should be inclusive and participatory, and include transparency and accountability mechanisms, as well as promoting inclusive democratic governance through consultation.

5.3 Impact of SIDDR

The impact of the SIDDR on DDR programming is impossible to determine, as the Final Report was overshadowed in a very short space of time by the publication of the IDDRS and the OEDC-DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform. The SIDDR does not appear to have been the key reference source for the majority of DDR processes researched by this project, the implication being that ultimately, the SIDDR process may historically be regarded as one of the multitude of events on the DDR conference circuit rather than a key step in reforming DDR processes. However there was adherence to a number of the fundamentals of SIDDR in many countries:

- Community development projects were incorporated into DDR programming in countries such as CAR, East Timor, Liberia and the Republic of Congo;
- The needs of women and children associated with armed conflict were prioritised in many of the MDRP processes;
- DDR programming was linked to peace processes and/or post-conflict peacebuilding in countries such Burundi, Nepal, Sudan and Uganda;
- Transitional justice and DDR processes were linked in Uganda (Amnesty Commission);
- Private sector businesses were involved with DDR, although on a small scale, in countries such as Liberia and the DRC; and

- Specialised and parallel projects for specific target groups have been implemented in a number of MDRP processes.

In addition, the SIDDR process did bring together key intellectuals, policy-makers and practitioners in the DDR field, and succeeded in conceptually mainstreaming DDR within post-conflict peacebuilding debates. Such a meeting of minds would also undoubtedly have provided informal opportunities to brainstorm, network and discuss the strengths and weakness of conventional approaches to DDR programming.

6. The UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)

While the conclusions of SIDDR were rather broad, a parallel exercise conducted by the UN, known as IDDRS, was developing much more specific policy recommendations, including detailed guidelines to DDR implementation globally.

6.1 Overview

The primary aim of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) was to promote greater coordination and integration of UN DDR programming.⁶⁶ This was a response to the fact that DDR programmes have historically tended to be carried out in a disjointed, non-integrated way due to poor coordination, poor planning and support, and sometimes competition among different departments, agencies, funds and programmes.

The IDDRS was developed by the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAWG-DDR), which includes various UN departments, agencies, programmes and funds, as well as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Following two years of workshop discussions and extensive consultations with DDR practitioners from the UN, member states, NGOs and the World Bank, the IDDRS were approved in July 2006.⁶⁷

The IDDRS were designed to provide direction and guidance to those engaged in preparing, implementing and supporting DDR programmes. They are a comprehensive compilation of knowledge, lessons identified and established practice on a wide range of issues relating to DDR concepts, policies and strategies, programme planning, design, management, and monitoring and evaluation. They also offer detailed guidance on key issues, such as information dissemination

⁶⁶ UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IAWG-DDR). 2006. "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards". New York: United Nations, 1.10, pp. 1-5. The IDDRS handbook is divided into comprehensive and accessible modules, which can be removed from the handbook in the event that that user only requires to be informed about specific programming aspects of DDR. The handbook is also available online, and no fee is charged for downloading it.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

and sensitization, food aid and food security, women and gender, children, youths, health, and HIV/AIDS.⁶⁸

6.2 Fundamental principles of IDDRS

According to IDDRS, five overarching principles should guide the UN approach to DDR. Programmes should be “people-centred”, “flexible, accountable and transparent”, “nationally owned”, “integrated”, and “well planned”. The IDDRS recommends that non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment of participants and beneficiaries should be the core principles of DDR programming, especially in the establishment of eligibility criteria for beneficiaries of DDR processes.

In particular, the following should be included:

- Mechanisms to identify and include eligible women in DDR programmes;
- Measures to ensure the unconditional release of children associated with armed conflict, and protection of children;
- Reintegration benefits and opportunities geared to the specific needs of the relevant groups;
- Reintegration benefits that include the families and spouses of ex-combatants;
- Consultation and participation of beneficiaries in the planning and design of DDR processes.⁶⁹

IDDRS, like SIDDR and the MDRP approach, recognises that the primary responsibility for DDR programmes should rest with national stakeholders. It recommends that the UN play a neutral role in supporting DDR processes. National ownership is, however, broader than exclusive central government ownership. Genuine national ownership requires the participation of a wide range of state and non-state actors at the national, regional and local levels, including civil society organizations. However, where national capacity is weak, the UN should work to systematically develop and strengthen it. Further, DDR practitioners should ensure that key national actors become genuine partners in DDR.⁷⁰

Where DDR programmes are linked with peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and development processes (which involve a variety of national and international military, police and civilian actors and institutions), the IDDRS recommends that an integrated approach be adopted. This reduces the likelihood of duplication, miscommunication, the establishment of conflicting programmes and the wastage of resources.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 1.10, pp. 3-5.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 2.10, pp. 8-15.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 3.30, pp. 1-28.

6.3 Linking DDR to security, humanitarian and peacebuilding programmes

Traditionally, DDR was seen as a relatively separate, ‘stand-alone’ exercise, largely unconnected conceptually or institutionally to broader projects of development, arms control or security sector reform. The IDDRS formalised a growing sense that DDR should be much more closely coordinated, if not integrated with, a wide range of related programming initiatives. As a result, an integrated DDR programme would be likely to generate a new integrated architecture, which would bring UN agencies and departments together.

The IDDRS recommend that DDR processes be linked to relevant security, humanitarian, peacebuilding and recovery programmes, and security-related interventions, particularly during the planning stage of such DDR processes. Examples include: mine action, arms control and disarmament (SALW), and security sector reform (SSR). The failure of previous DDR initiatives to lead onto or incorporate elements of SSR had been widely seen as a problem, often leading to renewed tensions or conflict, with an unreformed military or police force repeating the mistakes of the past.

Similarly, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has the potential to undermine DDR efforts, as SALW provide those parties that did not enthusiastically endorse the peace agreement with the means to reignite the armed conflict. This was the case with the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) in Angola in the early-1990s following the signing of a peace agreement (Bicesse Accords).⁷¹ The immediate post-conflict environment provides an opportunity to control the supply of, and demand for, small arms and light weapons, but effective integration or coordination of SALW and DDR programmes poses some challenges.

6.4 Phasing issues during DDR and human security implications

*6.4.1 Disarmament*⁷²

The IDDRS recognise that national governments have the right and responsibility to apply their own national standards to disarmament operations within their territory, but should comply with international and regional arms control conventions, standards and best practices. The IDDRS stipulates that, where appropriate, the principles of ‘proportional and fair disarmament’ and consultation with key stakeholders should be applied. In addition, DDR programmes should also avoid attaching monetary value to weapons as a means of encouraging their surrender, as this may actually contribute the proliferation of arms.

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch. 1994. *Angola: Arms Trade and the Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections*. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 12-18.

⁷² IAWG-DDR, 2006, 4.10, pp. 1-26.

*6.4.2 Demobilisation*⁷³

According to the IDDRS, the timing, sequencing and implementation of demobilisation processes should be realistic (given the operational context) and strictly adhered to in order to build the confidence of participants and beneficiaries in the process. In addition, demobilisation should not be initiated until pre-agreed conditions of readiness have been achieved. IDDRS recognises that the human security of vulnerable groups is critical to sustainable peace and development, and hence the IDDRS recommends that the specific needs of those women, youth, children, the disabled and the chronically ill who participated in combat and/or were associated with armed forces and groups, should be taken into account.

The IDDRS recommends that reinsertion assistance should preferably not involve large lump-sum cash payments. However, if money is to be provided to beneficiaries, it should be paid in small instalments, and linked to employment or services performed by the ex-combatant for the benefit of the community. Mobile demobilisation is seen to be more cost effective, expedient and flexible than cantonment approaches.

*6.4.3 Social/Economic reintegration*⁷⁴

In order to enhance the potential success of social and economic reintegration, IDDRS emphasises the need for social cohesion between ex-combatants, their families and relevant community members. In this regard, reintegration processes should be designed to stabilise both the socio-economic environment of ex-combatants, as well as benefit the community into which ex-combatants reintegrate. DDR can also support community reconciliation through focused peacebuilding and reconciliation activities. Reintegration programmes should be planned and designed through a participatory process that involves ex-combatants and communities (particularly women), local and national authorities, and non-governmental actors in planning and decision-making. In addition, DDR programmes should also be co-ordinated with efforts to strengthen and reform both the justice and the security sectors.

6.5. Gender and DDR⁷⁵

One area that many traditional DDR programmes had largely ignored was that of gender. In all armed conflicts, women have faced particular problems that have not normally been addressed by traditional DDR processes. There have been numerous cases where females have been exposed to sexual and gender-based violence. In contexts of armed conflict, notions of masculinity are often linked to the possession and use of weapons, as well as violent actions towards women. The gender-specific role of men in post-conflict situations has also gained more attention. In some cases,

⁷³ Ibid., 4.20, pp. 1-33.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 4.30, pp. 1-43.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 5.10, pp. 1-40.

male ex-combatants are unable to fulfil the role as the breadwinner of the household following the end of the armed conflict. This may result in increased levels of frustration, which can lead to an increase in incidences of domestic violence and/or alcohol/drug abuse among male ex-combatants. Consequently, the IDDRS advocates that DDR programmes include appropriate counselling mechanisms and flexible, gender specific socioeconomic support.

Women and girls usually shoulder the burden of caring for family members and others, and are therefore less able than men to take advantage of training, employment and other income-generating opportunities that are provided in DDR processes. Consequently, the IDDRS recommends that socio-economic reintegration programmes should be targeted towards:

- Providing physical and psychosocial rehabilitation to disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants so that they do not become a burden for women and girls.
- Taking into account specific gender dynamics related to access to land and housing, particularly when traditional practices and legal systems do not accommodate female-headed households or women's land ownership.
- Assessing the extent to which the production of crops and animal husbandry are divided among household members according to gender and age.
- Preventing the marginalisation of women ex-combatants, supporters and dependents, and war widows, and providing them with assistance.
- Supporting the transformation of violent masculine identities into non-violent ones through information, sensitization and counselling.
- Allocating resources to train female ex-combatants, supporters, dependents and community members on how to care for and cope with children traumatized by conflict.

6.6. Vulnerable groups

In addition to addressing the situation of women in DDR programming, the IDDRS made considerable progress in addressing the need of ex-combatants who have particular needs and vulnerabilities and in targeting groups outside the immediate beneficiary group of ex-combatants.

A good example is the new emphasis in the programme recommendations in IDDRS emphasis on the special needs of youth.⁷⁶ DDR programmes have often been designed and implemented in environments where the majority of former combatants were youths, an age group defined by the UN as those between 15 and 24 years of age. Their vulnerability to violence, disease and other illnesses, and their exclusion from decision-making processes and structures has the potential to make reintegration a challenging process. For example, in conflict-affected environments, youth, and

⁷⁶ Ibid., 5.20, pp. 1-39.

young men in particular, respond to authority in a negative manner, and are often attracted to sub-cultures that encourage violence as a means of social expression by appealing to their sense of ‘manhood’. Hence, according to the IDDRS, DDR programmes should take account of the special needs of youth.

The socio-economic reintegration of young ex-combatants depends largely on their ability to engage in economically productive activities following the end of the armed conflict. In some cases, as in the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone, ex-combatant youth have no memory of peaceful times or a “normal” civilian life. To respond, IDDRS suggests that DDR programmes should include: conflict management and interpersonal skills training; as well as processes that target youth sensitiveness to authority and intergenerational conflicts. Access to counselling, education and training, including apprenticeship programmes should also be provided. According to the IDDRS, creating youth-specific labour-intensive physical and social infrastructure projects can also facilitate the reintegration of youth.

Similarly, IDDRS also addresses the issues of children (those under 15).⁷⁷ Again, in many DDR situations children have been recruited as soldiers, or are engaged in assisting armed forces with various tasks, or are part of the wider network of family members of combatants. IDDRS points out that their needs (and therefore programme designs) are very different from those of adults, and they should be part of a separate DDR process that can attend to their needs, supported by specialised child support and protection agencies.

A further group that has not always been properly addressed in DDR programmes is combatants and civilians who have crossed national borders into neighbouring territories.⁷⁸ Conflicts have often involved these spillovers of combatants and associated civilians across state borders, but DDR programmes have not always responded with the appropriate regional approach to tackle the problem. IDDRS drew up some specific recommendations, to permit demobilisation in host countries, and particularly stressed the need for close co-ordination and links between/among all DDR programmes in a region, including regular co-ordination meetings on DDR issues.

6.7 The implementation and impact of the IDDRS

The IDDRS has only been publicly available since late-2006, and as a result, there has been a limited time period for its rollout and implementation. However, two national DDR processes, namely Haiti and Sudan, were officially declared pilot processes for implementing (as well as determining the effectiveness of) the IDDRS. Initial indications suggest that implementation of integrated DDR approaches in line with the IDDRS framework has been extremely difficult, and that several case-studies

⁷⁷ Ibid., 5.30, pp. 1-40.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 5.40, pp. 1-50.

suggest a short fall in meeting the high expectations engendered by the IDDRS process. A critical overview of the Sudanese process is provided below. In addition, an assessment of the IDDRS in relation current developments in Nepal is also provided.

It is important to note that the IDDRS is the culmination of more than a decade of implementation insights from the UN, as well as other, DDR programmes. For example, the DDR processes in East Timor, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the MDRP DDR programmes (all of which have a link with the UN) employed some of the principles and recommendations of the IDDRS. Thus it is difficult to isolate IDDRS as an isolated influence on programme design and implementation, but certainly Haiti and Sudan are still viewed by the UN as key pilot projects for IDDRS implementation.

The IDDRS had a significant impact on the Sudan programme design, and Sudan was selected as a pilot for implementing the IDDRS. In terms of policy, the Sudanese Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) clearly reflects IDDRS principles, and has a key focus on integrated programming (design, implementation and support) between the UN agencies (as well as other relevant international agencies). An integrated UN DDR Unit was established in Sudan, in which UNDP and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) staff sought to work together under a single management structure. In addition, the DDR process in Sudan has an explicit human security focus.

Despite the positive rhetoric at the beginning of the process, the DDR programme in Sudan has been much more complex and challenging than the programme designers had expected. It is being implemented in the context of a fragile North-South peace agreement and conflicts in Darfur and other parts of the country, and there is only limited commitment to the process by the key parties. These external problems would have posed serious challenges to any DDR programme, but other factors in programme design are also arguably responsible for the failure to implement effectively an integrated DDR package.

Research conducted within this project concluded that there was a substantial gap between the principles contained in the IDDRP and what has been implemented in Sudan, and pointed to four factors that can be seen as responsible.

- The fragility and weakness of the peace agreement as a basis for peace in Sudan, and specifically as a framing document for DDR.
- The inability to translate the IDDRS principles into practice and, in particular, the failure of 'integrated' UN management of DDR.

- The breakdown in international political engagement and cooperation on the peace agreement and the security sector.
- Unrealistic expectations of what DDR programming could achieve and weak capacity to deliver.⁷⁹

Internal divisions and institutional rivalries between UN agencies, and between centres of power in Khartoum, Juba, Geneva and New York have at times undermined the UN DDR Unit. In particular, one analyst claims that “tensions emerged between DPKO and UNDP over the best way forward”, with DPKO taking a more traditional top-down approach, while UNDP advocated a more community-based model.⁸⁰

These internal disputes have damaged the UN integrated mission’s performance and delayed programming in a number of key areas. Researchers suggest that greater ‘integration’ has not yet translated into more effective and efficient DDR and improved capacity in national DDR institutions. Where there has been effective cooperation between the various institutional components of the DDR process in Sudan, it seems to have been based on the proactive and problem-solving approach of key individuals and the quality of management rather than institutional arrangements.⁸¹

There have been similar doubts expressed over the integrated approach to DDR in Haiti⁸², but as in Sudan, it is not clear how much institutional cleavages have been significant factors, and how much the programme was simply poorly designed to deal with the complex situation inside Haiti. Clearly, both pilot projects have faced significant challenges in implementing the integrated approach demanded by IDDRS, but both pilot projects faced serious problems that any institutional design would have found difficult to overcome. It is still too early to definitively conclude whether the IDDRS approach to institutional design is productive, but it is clear that the IDDRS process has highlighted a number of key issues and challenges.

6.8 Emerging challenges

The rollout of the IDDRS process, as with many DDR programmes, is encountering (and will continue to encounter in the foreseeable future) a variety of implementation challenges and obstacles. Four themes in this regard are outlined below.

6.8.1 Disarmament, cantonment, demobilisation

The efficiency and effectiveness of disarming, cantoning and demobilising ex-combatants is fundamental to the success of any DDR process. UN agencies typically

⁷⁹ Henry Smith. 2008. “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sudan”, DDR and Human Security Project Mini-Case-Study. Saferworld/CICS, at www.ddr-humansecurity.org.uk.

⁸⁰ Robert Muggah. 2008. “Great Expectations: (dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti”, Humanitarian Practice Network, at <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2878>, accessed on 2 July 2008.

⁸¹ Smith. 2008. p. 28

⁸² Muggah. 2008.

face logistical and infrastructural challenges in many post-conflict environments in terms of providing for the disarmament, cantonment and demobilising ex-combatants. Often the UN is required to establish such programmes when the UN mission is in the initial start-up phase when the required logistical, human and material resources are yet to be acquired. Some locations may in fact be inaccessible. In such circumstances the UN, related agencies and the relevant government authority may, out of necessity, implement sub-standard disarmament, cantonment and demobilisation measures. In such cases, ex-combatants may not be effectively disarmed, housed, fed and clothed. In addition, ex-combatants may have to spend considerable periods of time in cantonment areas with little or no productive activities to keep them occupied.

This state of affairs may result in conflict, protests and violence within the cantonment areas. Ex-combatants may, out of frustration or desperation, abscond with their weapons, and possibly engage in banditry activities, or re-ignite the armed conflict. Hence, it is essential for the appropriate UN agencies to have acquired the requisite resources and logistical arrangements prior to engaging in disarmament, cantonment and demobilisation exercises.

6.8.2 Reinsertion and reintegration planning

Successful reinsertion and reintegration is dependent on the quality of planning. However, effective planning cannot be undertaken in the absence of accurate information. Information on the following is critical to the success of planning: socio-economic characteristics and career aspirations of the ex-combatants; employment data and a market analysis; as well as the government's development and security sector reform strategies.

Nevertheless, in many countries where IDDRS-related processes are being pursued, the information in question is unavailable or difficult to acquire. The generation of this information is a time-consuming process, and often the architects of DDR processes are under considerable political pressure to implement such processes, and do not have the resources nor the time to gather this information.

6.8.3 Long-term reintegration

As with the majority of DDR programmes, the reintegration component is the most complex and challenging. The reason being, as previously indicated, effective reintegration is a long-term process (that can take decades), and historically most DDR programmes are typically designed to be implemented over a period not exceeding five years. This is an acute problem for the UN and its related agencies, as UN bodies can only effectively implement DDR programmes in the context of a UN mission, which in most cases is a transitional arrangement. Reintegration support is often required long after the UN has concluded its mission.

The UN is often required to implement reintegration processes in environments that are not conducive to success. The economy is often depressed or heavily constrained

by the damage caused by years of armed conflict, and the presence of the state and/or the UN mission in a number of rural areas is often absent. The result is that opportunities for employment and sustainable livelihoods are severely limited. In addition, some DDR programmes are implemented in environments characterised by episodes of violent conflict.

In Liberia, for example, the DDR process was initiated in December 2003. However, these programmes were implemented in a territory that had been severely disrupted by civil war, and characterised by an economy that was fragile and constrained. Reintegration support in the form of vocation training and education programmes were provided. Nonetheless, the unsophisticated nature of the economy, and the lack of government and/or UN presence in many rural parts of Liberia, meant that large numbers of ex-combatants pursued income-generating activities in the informal and illegal sector, such as rubber tapping, diamond and gold mining, motorcycle taxis and pit-sawing. The UN continues to provide targeted reintegration support, although the UN is incrementally drawing down its presence within this country, and it is anticipated by 2010 that a substantial component of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) personnel will be withdrawn.

6.8.4 Individual versus community reintegration

Previously implemented reintegration processes have tended to focus almost exclusively on providing support to individual ex-combatants. The key assumption of this type of programming was that by providing ex-combatants with skills and resources, these individuals would reintegrate into civilian life on their own terms. However, to date, the long-term results of this approach have been mediocre at best.

Projects that target the potential reception communities (of substantial populations of ex-combatants) have been a minority pursuit within the DDR sector, and in particular, are not a significant feature of the IDDRS. According to the empirical research that currently exists, significant numbers of ex-combatants in developing countries have experienced difficulties integrating in both urban and rural settings. Given this state of affairs, DDR programmers should consider giving more priority to community-based projects that provide incentives for communities to embrace the reintegration processes.

6.9 The way forward for the IDDRS

Despite the setbacks in the DDR process in Sudan, the problems encountered in Haiti and the inconsistent application of the IDDRS principles in Central Africa, it seems highly likely that the IDDRS will become increasingly influential with respect to the design and implementation of DDR processes (particularly where there is a UN presence) over the next five years. The reason for this is that there appears to be considerable political will and momentum behind the implementation of the IDDRS, both within the UN system and the international donor community.

The IDDRS presents a coherent standards and measures for the proactive pursuance of the DDR dynamic, as it was developed with “best practice” in mind. However, the challenge is in the implementation and co-ordination of activities. Also, in order for the IDDRS to have a more constructive impact on sustainable peace, poverty alleviation and human security, one of the key tensions within the IDDRS should be urgently addressed. That is, nationally-led processes may actively seek to not adhere to the other principles and recommendations of the IDDRS.

Conclusion

The initiatives, processes and programmes that have been explored in this paper indicate that over the past few years there has been a noticeable intellectual shift within the DDR community towards taking cognisance of the linkages between DDR and the related phenomena of poverty alleviation and human security. This is particularly evident in terms of the conception of DDR approaches and programming, as with the SIDDR and IDDRS.

Nevertheless, the extent to which this intellectualising has been converted into action is yet to be effectively realised. The MDRP is a case in point. There is evidence to suggest that the MDRP personnel are aware that in order for the DDR processes to be sustainable, they need to be geared towards enhancing poverty alleviation and human security of the broader community. However, the sizeable nature of the Programme, its technocratic approach, as well as the fact that the MDRP in the latter part of the implementation stage, has meant that it has been very difficult to make the necessary adjustments.

The effective implementation of the IDDRS faces similar challenges. Clearly, more integrated DDR processes will benefit the poor, as well as enhance sustainable peace and human security. Nonetheless, significant institutional reforms and changes in organisational cultures and practices are required before such progress can take place.

In general, in order for the more holistic thinking on DDR to be incorporated into DDR programming, it is imperative that significant resources, greater long-term and meticulous planning (based on accurate intelligence), as well as consultation with national governments and affected communities takes place.